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IN THE SllPREME COURT 
STJ\TE OF UTJ\fl 
GFtJEVJEVE A. SMIT!I, ,TF:SSE F. 
'.:MJTll, BETH M. SMITH, and 
Sl\LLI SMJTH GIRARD, 
Involuntary Defendants, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
and Cross-Appellant. ) 
vs. 
C!lf'RLES I.. APPLEBY, JR., 
C'l\Tl!ERINF R. APPLEBY, DON 
RJARNSON, and GRACE BJARNSON, 
Defendants, Appellants, 
and Cross-Respondents. 
Casf' No. l 7661 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiffs filed a Verified Complaint May 8, 1978 
seeking lhe forfeiture of a lease by reason of Defendants' 
failure to cure various defaults set forth in a "Notice To Cure 
flcf0ults" given to Defendants on or about M0rch 20, 1978, and 
lncorpor0tcd by reference as Exhibit "B" in Plaintiffs' Verified 
Complaint, said notice itemized specific defaults, including 
insurance, health code violations, buildina code violations, and 
waste, allcqing the premise~ posed risks of injury to the public. 
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DISPOSITION JN THE J,O\JER COURT 
At trial, evidence was provisionally received nn all 
defaults hut the trial court ultimately ruled that the Verified 
Complaint stated a claim for relief only with respect to 
insurance. The trial court found a hre0ch on the j nsurance issur 
that was not timely cured, but refused to declare a forfeiture of 
the lease, finding that the breach w0s not substantial enough to 
justify a forfeiture and that the forfeiture was waived by 
Plaintiffs' acceptance of rents (R304). The trial court found 
that Plaintiff was entitled to recover her attorney's fees under 
paragraph 12 of the lease (R340), but only for fees incurred 
relating to the insurance issue (R305), and found that amount to 
he $3,487.50 and awarded judgment accordingly (R341). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants attack the award of attorney's fees in five 
points consuming 36 pages of their brief and assert a sixth point 
that, even though they were in default, the trial court should 
have awarded attorney's fee to them. 
Plaintiff naturally seeks the affirmance of the award 
of attorney's fees and cross-appeals bv requesting the Supreme 
Court to find that Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint with exhibits 
attached and incorporated therein was sufficient to raise the 
issues of health code violations, building code violations, and 
waste on which considerable evidence w0s presented and which 
consumed most of the trial time, but which was excluded from the 
trial court's consideration when it ruled that a claim for relief 
was stated only with respect to insurance (R303). 
2 
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~Jternatively, assuming the trial court correctly ruled 
that only the insurance issue was sufficiently raised, Plaintiff 
requests the Supreme Court to find that the trial court abused 
its discretion by denying Plaintiff's motion to amend the 
complaint (R215) made during trial. 
Finally, Plaintiff seeks reversal of the trial court's 
flndjnq that the lessors waived breaches of the lease by 
;1cccpL11wc of rent for i1 lmost three years between the filino of 
the Verified Complaint and the date of judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent (Plaintiff) disagrees with the STATEMENT OF 
FACTS set forth in Appellants' brief, particularly as follows: 
1. The lease was the joint product of both the Lessors 
0nd Lessees and was not drafted by Lessors only. 
7. Plaintiff disagrees with Appellants' 
characterization of the legal effect -of Plaintiffs' Verified 
Complaint as Plaintiff asserts it sufficiently raises issues 
other than insurance. 
3. Plaintiff disagrees with Appellants' statement 
(page 10-11) that insurance coverage existed between April 27, 
1978 and May 10, 1978. The insurance agent stated in a 
deposition on August 7, 1978 that there was no insurance between 
those dates and repeated that testimony on the witness stand at 
trial. A full reading of his testimony should reveal that he did 
not recant these statements, but merely admitted there might have 
been coverage during that period. The Verified Complaint was 
filed May 8, 1978 when no insurance coverage existed, and even if 
3 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
it did, Plaintiff was not aware of it until Mr. Labrum supposedly 
recanted at trial. Regardless, the trial rnurt found, and 
Defendants admit (page 7 of Appellant's hrirf), that tho re wen• 
breaches on the insurance issue. 
4. Plaintiff takes exception to Appellants' reliance 
(pages ll-12 and 19) on a stipulation (Rl62) and partial 
dismissal with prejudice (Rl64) as somehow insulating Defendants 
from an assessment of attorney's fees. On Plaintiff's motion 
(R210), supporting affidavit (R208-09), and testimony of five 
witnesses at trial on February 20, 1981 (R 198-99), the 
stipulation and partial dismissal was properly set aside 
(R302-03). 
Plaintiffs' primary concern in giving Defendants the 
"Notice To Cure Defaults" and in filing the Verified Complaint 
was to protect the general public from safety hazards on the 
leased premises and to protect themselves from liability (R364). 
The premises were found "unsafe and dangerous to human life" 
(R365-367) by state and local health and building inspectors. 
Additional facts relied upon by Plaintiff will he 
referred to as appropriate to support the arguments made 
hereinafter on this appeal. 
RESPONDENT'S POINTS ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE PLAINTIFF WAS 
PROPER, BEING BASED UPON A CONTRACTUAL Al.REEM ENT AND SUPPORTED BY 
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE. 
The basis for awarding attorney's fees was paraqraph 12 
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of th(' lease (Rl4, 363) which provides: 
"12. ATTORNEY'S FEES: In the event of a default in 
the performance on the part of either Lessor or Lessee 
the party determined to be guilty of such default or ' 
breach of the instant Lease shall be liable and 
responsible to the non-defaulting party for reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred by the non-defaulting party in 
enforcing the terms of this agreement or exercising any 
rights or remedies hereunder or any rights or remedies 
otherwise provided by law." 
Defendants were aware of this provision and were 
reminded of it by the last paragraph of the "Notice To Cure 
Defilults" (R21, 364) which stated: 
"Should legal action be necessary to recover possession 
of the leased premises, lessors will ask the court for 
an award of attorney's fees against lessees, and each 
of them, for all reasonable attorney's fees incurred by 
lessors in enforcing the terms of the lease agreement 
or any other rights or remedies available thereunder as 
provided in paragraph 12 of the lease agreement." 
Paragraph 13 of the Verified Complaint (R3) alleges 
that Defendants were served with this notice on or about March 
21, 1978 and incorporates the entire notice as Exhibit "B" to the 
complaint. Paragraph 13 of Defendants Answer (R45) admits that 
Defendant Donald Bjarnson received said notice. Paragraph 28 of 
Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint alleges Plaintiffs are entitled to 
recover attorney's fees. 
The trial court found (R304) that: 
"6. With respect to the insurance issue, the court 
finds that the failure by lessee to maintain liability 
insurance with $300,000 limits breached the 
requirements of paragraph 15 of the lease, and was not 
cured within 30 days of notice, although efforts were 
made by lessee." 
The trial court's remedy for this default was not a forfeiture of 
the lease, but an attempt to place the Plaintiff (Lessor) in the 
Silme <'Ondition as if the breach had not occurred, citing 49 Am. 
5 
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Jur. 7d 1038 (R304, 340). This we1s clone by ,1w0rcling PL-iintiff 
her attorney's fees, but only those incurred with respect to t~ 
insurance issue. 
During the trial, many motions, rulings, and tri nble 
issues were taken under advisement. After ruling that PL1i ntit: 
was entitled to attorney's fees incurred in enforcing the 
insurance covenant the court stated (R305) that: 
"While this relief (attorney's fees) was reque steel in 
the complaint, no evidence w0s given at the trial. 
Since the uncertainty as to triable issues may have 
contributed to this omission, the court will receive 
evidence within ten days by way of affidavit from both 
sides on this issue, unless either party requests a 
hearing, or unless plaintiff is waiving this cl~im." 
Plaintiff thereafter submitted affidavits of John L. 
Miles (R377-324) and Ronald Boutwell (R337-339) on this issue and 
Defendants submitted two affidavits of Michael D. Hughes 
(R327-328 and R332-334). The trial court then ruled for 
Plaintiff, awarding $3,487.50 as attorney's fees on the insurance 
issue to place Plaintiff in the same condition as if the breach 
had not occurred (49 Am. Jur. 2d 1038). 
Defendants raise five points in a 42 page brief 
objecting to the award of attorney's fees. The lengthy brief is 
notable only for its lack of relevant authority. The first point 
asserts a lack of proper testimony because the award was based 
upon sworn affidavits instead of upon sworn testimony subject to 
cross examination at trial. The Defend~nt conveniently ignor the 
fact that the trial court afforded both parties the opportunity 
for a hearing upon request (R305). Defendants waived their 
opportunity for such a hearing by electing to submit afficinvits 
6 
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on tho issue instead of requesting a hearing. Because 
tho trial court gave more weight and/or credibility to 
Plaintiff's affidavits, the Defendants are attacking the 
procedure they implicitly agreed to when they chose to submit 
affidavits. The trial judge presided over the five day trial, 
was able to review the extensive pleadings, and being on attorney 
himself, was able to make a determination of the value of 
sorvices rendered by Plaintiff's attorneys. The Supreme Court of 
the United State has expressed the view that a court can proceed 
upon its own knowledge of the value of an attorney's services 
(Harrison v. Perea 168 U.S. 311, 42 L. Ed. 478, 18 C. St. 129). 
The second point appellants raise relies upon the 
stipulation executed December 8, 1980. Page 24 of Appellants 
brief states that Mr. Boutwell informed Mrs. Girard to find a new 
attorney about that time when, in fact, Mrs. Girard already had 
retained Mr. Miles as her attorney (Rll 7) as early as September 
2, 1980. As explained in paragraph 4 of Respondent's STATEMENT 
OF FACTS, this stipulation and the resulting order were thrown 
out of this case and cannot be effectively asserted against 
Plaintiff. Appellants' argument indulges in speculation, totally 
irrelevant, about whether Plaintiff has actually paid these 
attorney's fees, ignoring the fact that in this case the amount 
of attorney's time would be the same whether there was one Lessor 
or 100 Lessors. Mr. Boutwell represented all three Lessors at 
the time he performed his services relating to the insurance 
issue and the work he performed would be the same regardless of 
the number of Lessors (R337). 
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The third point appellants rais0 claims the trial court 
committ0c'l reversible error under Pule 6l, LT.R.C.P., in allowing 
the parties to submit proof, by affidavit or hearing, on the 
issue of Plaintiff's attorneys fees. Appellants' claim that 
attorney's fees were not raised or plcac'l by Plaintiff is simply 
not in conformity with the facts, set forth above, showing that 
attorney's fees were claimed in both the "Notice To Cure 
Defaults" and in the Verifiec'l Complaint. Appellants' argument 
under Rule 61, U.P.C.P., ignors the more relevant Rule 54(c) (1), 
U.R.C.P., which provides: 
"Ill Generally. Except as to a party against whom a 
judgment is entered by default, every final juc'lgment 
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose 
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has 
not demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be 
given for or against one or more of several claimants; 
and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, 
determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each 
side as between or among themselves." 
This rule was considered in Palombi v. D. & C. 
Builders, 22 U. 2d 297, 452 P. 2d 325 where the Utah Supreme 
Court held that even though Plaintiff did not (emphasis supplied) 
ask for attorney fees in the complaint, this fact would not 
preclude the trial court from awarding them to Plaintiff since 
Rule 54(c) indicates that there shall be liberality of procedure 
to reach the result which justice requires. Here, attorney's 
fees were requested by Plaintiffs and because of confusion over 
triable issues the court allowed both parties to submit 
affidavits or request a hearing on attorney's fees prior to final 
judgment. The trial judge's actions were in harmony with the 
objective of Rule 54 (c) (1), U.R.C.P. 
8 
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Had Plaintiff's attorneys presented evidence on 
~ttornry's fees at trial, subsequent affidavits or hearings still 
,,,nulc1 havr been necessary, under the trial court's final ruling, 
to eliminate from such fees all time spent on matters not related 
to the insurance issue. 
Appellants' fourth point on attorney's fees asserts 
that the relief afforded Plaintiff at trial was no greater than 
what Defendants stipulated to prior to trial. This assertion is 
not supported by the trial court's finding (R341) that: 
"The stipulation to issuance of a preliminary 
injunction (with a $500.00 bond) was not the same as 
stipulating that a breach of the insurance covenant had 
occurred, and that a permanent injunction could issue, 
without bond. This issue was in fact litigated, and 
gave rise to the entitlement to attorneys fees." 
Appellants' reliance on the stipulation (R 162) which 
was thrown out (R 302) is unavailing because that was not made 
with Plaintiff's knowledge or consent, nor did it stipulate to a 
br<?ach of the insurance covenant or to a permanent injunction and 
an award of $3,487.50 to restore Plaintiff to the same condition 
as if the breach had not occurred. 
The appellants' fifth argument on attorney's fees 
asserts that the trial court improperly tried the issue by 
affidavit. Appellants rely on Freed Finance Co. v. Stoker Motor 
Co. 537 P.2d 1039, (Utah 1975). In that case the Utah Supreme 
Court held that the trial court's summary judgment must be set 
aside, and in reference to attorney's fees said that: 
"Even if there were no disputed issue of material fact, 
the summary judgment could not award an attorney's fee 
without a stipulation as to the amount, an unrebutted 
affidavit, or evidence given as to the value thereof 
(emphasis supplied). Without any basis therefore, the 
9 
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trial court awarded plaintiff an attorney's fee ln the 
sum of $30,000.00." 
In this case, the trial court was not considcrjng 
summary judgment where a material issue of fact would preclude 
the summary judgment. A further distinction is that hoth sides 
did, in fact, submit evidence by way of affidavits on the value 
of attorney's fees and waived the opportunity to request a 
hearing on this issue. 
RESPONDENT'S POINTS ON CROSS-APPEAL 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS' VERIFIED COMPLAINT WITH EXHIBITS ATTACHED 
AND INCORPORATED THEREIN SUFFICIENTLY RAISED THE ISSUES OF HEALTH 
CODE VIOLATIONS, BUILDING CODE VIOLATIONS, AND WASTE SO THAT 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL ON THESE ISSUES SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
CONSIDERED BY THE COURT, DEFENDANTS NOT BEING UNFAIRLY SURPRISED 
OR PREJUDICED. 
Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint alleges, in pertinent 
portions, the following: 
"13. On or about the 21st day of March, 1978, 
Defendants were served a NOTICF. TO CURE DEFAULTS. A 
true copy of said notice is attached to this complaint 
as Exhibit "B" and incorporated by reference as if 
fully set forth." (R3). 
"24. Lessee defendants are in default under the lease 
and have failed to cure said default within 30 days 
after receiving notice of said default. 
25. Because of lessee defendants continuinq default 
plaintiffs are entitled to re-enter the premises and 
take possession." (R4) 
"30. The lease agreement provides that the leased 
premises shall be operated in the main as a 
recreational and therapeutic spa. 
10 
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31. Such operation allows many customers to come onto 
the premises for the purpose of bathing in a pool area 
and a grotto area. 
32. In the pool area, there are no life guards or 
anyone else to prevent accidents or prevent small 
children from swimming unattencled in the large swimming 
pool. 
33. The grotto area is located under steep cliffs of 
rocks and boulders. Occasionally a rock or boulder 
will fall onto the grotto area where bathers are 
bathing." (RS). 
"3S. Operation of the leased premises poses risks of 
injury to body and property. It is because of such 
risks that plaintiffs have continually tried to make 
lessee secure liability insurance on the premises as 
provided for in the lease agreement." (RS). 
"WHEREFORE; plaintiffs pray for judgment against 
defendants as follows: 
1. Declaring defendants have breached the terms of 
the lease agreement. 
2. Quieting plaintiff's title to the real property 
described in the lease agreement. 
3. Placing plaintiffs in possession of the leased 
property." (R7) 
The "Notice To Cure Defaults", in pertinent portions, 
lists, in addition to insurance, the following defaults (R 
l 9-20) : 
"3. Lessees must not continue to operate the leased 
premises in violation of Utah State Division of Health, 
Code of Camp, Trailer Court, Hotel, Motel and Resort 
Sanitation Regulations, adopted by the Utah State Board 
of Health on February 21, 1968, under authority of 
26-lS-4, U.C.A., 19S3, as amended. 
4. Lessees must eliminate waste on the leased premises 
and restore said leased premises to that condition 
which the leased premise would now be in if said leased 
premises had been cared for in a reasonable and prudent 
manner as provided in paragraph 10 of said lease 
aareement. Particular areas where lack of care or 
w~ste has allowed the leased premises to become 
dilapidated are as follows: 
(a). The grotto area on the leased premises has become, 
and continues to be, unclean, unkept and dangerous to 
users. 
11 
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(b). The swimming pool areil is fal lin<J into disrepair 
and is a health h'1zard. Thf' pool area is in violation 
of the Utah State Division of Health, Regulations 
Relating to Operation and Maintenance of Public 
Swimming and Wading Pools. 
(c). The cabin motel units are falling in disrep2ir and 
are not in clean, sanitary and operable condition. 
There is no adequate or approved screening to control 
insects and the windows, shades, curtains, furniture 
and fixtures arc not clean and in good repair. The 
units are in violation of State law as referred to in 
paragraph 3 above, as well as county health laws. 
(d). The roads on the leased premises are in disrepair 
with chuck holes and inadequate graveling. 
(e). Electrical and plumbing on the leased premises is 
unsafe and does not comply with anv standard of 
safety. " 
Paragraph 13 of Defendants' answer (R45) admits that 
they received the "Notice To Cure Defaults" putting them on 
notice of the defaults claimed. That Defendants were well aware 
of the breaches alleged in the "Notice To Cure Defaults" is sho~ 
by Interrogatories filed by their attorney on August 21, 1978, 
specifically numbers 31, 32 (R58); 36 (R59); 43, 44, 45 (R60); 
and 46, 47, 48 (R61). These Interrogatories were answered on 
November 13, 1980 (Rl28-157) and supplemental answers on 
questions 28 and 29 were filed January 28, 1981 (R 172-183). 
Defendants objected strenuously to the inspection 
reports of the building inspectors and health inspectors, 
claiming unfair surprise, but these inspectors had communicated 
the problems to Defendants at or shortly after the time of 
inspection. These reports found the premises "to be unsafe and 
dangerous to human life" (R 366, 365, 367). 
12 
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Considerations of public policy dictate that when a 
public facility is found to be dangerous to human life, the court 
should not, on technical grounds, rule that the default was not 
rajsed in the pleadings and thereby allow the dangerous condition 
to continue. 
Defendants place unwarranted reliance on their claim 
that because Plaintiff did not provide them with a detailed list 
of deficiencies on the building and health code violations, 
Plaintiff cannot assert these violations at trial. Defendants 
seem to forget that it was they who agreed, in paragraph 11 of 
the lease, to abide by the laws, ordinances, or regulations of 
Washington County and the State of Utah (R 14) and that it was 
their duty as Lessees and operators to know the applicable laws, 
ordinances and regulations and abide by them. When the "Notice 
To Cure Defaults" was given to them, it became incumbent upon 
them to call in the inspectors, learn the deficiencies, and cure 
the same. Instead, they attempted to shift this responsibility 
onto Plaintiff by filing a set of 79 Interrogatories and then 
objected at trial when the evidence was offered. Had Defendants 
spent a few minutes making telephone calls to the building and 
health inspectors instead of hours drafting interrogatories, they 
would have quickly learned what defects existed. It should be 
remembered that these public inspectors were equally available to 
Defendants as they were to Plaintiffs. 
The "Notice To Cure Defaults" specifically referred to 
the Utah State Division of Health, Code of Camp, Trailer Court, 
Hotel, Motel and Resort Sanitation Regulations adopted by the 
13 
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Utah State Board of Health on February 7l, 1968 pursuant t ,, 
Section 26-15-4 of the Utah Code. 
without charge from the health department in St. George, Utah a~ 
was admitted at trial as Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 (R 368). 
Plaintiffs' could not have been ~ore specific as to the standa~ 
Defendants were required to meet. They should not be heard in 
claiming unfair surprise or prejudice. 
Particularly is this true when Plaintiffs' proposed 
Pre-trial Order (R 75-82) and Defendants own proposed pre-trial 
order (R 83-92) included the issues of building code violations, 
health code violations, and waste (R 87-88). 
Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint, with attached Exhibits 
incorporated therein, is sufficient under the liberalized rules 
of pleading. Rule 8(a), URCP, only requires a pleading to set 
forth a short and plain statement of the claim and a demand for 
the relief Plaintiff seeks. Rule lO(c), URCP, provides that: 
"Statements in a pleading may be adopted by reference 
in a different part of the same pleading or in another 
pleading, or in any motion. An exhibit to a pleading 
is a part thereof for all purposes." 
Plaintiff's complaint sets forth her claims in the 
numbered paragraphs thereof and in the exhibits adopted by 
reference. 
In Blackham v. Snelgrove 3 Utah 2d 157, 280 P. 7d 453 
the Supreme Court said that the complaint need only give fair 
notice of the nature and grounds of claim and an indication of 
the type of litigation. Defendants certainly had fair notice 
since the March 20, 1978 "Notice To Cure Defaults" specifically 
sets forth the defaults Plaintiff claimed then and is claiming 
14 
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now. When that notice was adopted in the complaint the 
ncfendants again had fair notice that these defaults were 
seriously being pursued. That Defendants knew this fact is 
evidenced by the interrogatories filed as early as August, 1978. 
'l'hc same remedy, that is, forfeiture of the lease, was being 
sought on account of all defaults, so no new relief was requested 
on account of building and health code violations that was not 
being sought because of failure to maintain insurance. 
Rule 8 (f), URCP, provides that "All pleadings shall be 
so construed as to do substantial justice." This is consistent 
with the fundamental purpose of liberalized pleadings to allow 
parties to present their legitimate contentions on the merits. 
Defendant's failure to object to Exhibit "B" as a part 
of the complaint by a motion for a more definite statement or a 
motion to strike has been waived under Rule 12 (h), URCP and 
Defendant cannot now complain that the issues raised by Exhibit 
"B" are not in the pleadings. Rule l(a), URCP, states: 
"They (the Rules of Civil Procedure) shall be liberally 
construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action." 
In Bunting Tractor Co. vs. Emmett D. Ford Contractors 2 
Utah 2d 275, 272 P.2d 191 the court held that in liberally 
construing and applying the Rules of Civil Procedure, the courts 
should seek to afford litigants every reasonable opportunity to 
be heard on the merits of their cases. In liberally construing 
the rules, courts look to the substance and merits of a 
controversy rather than to technicalities of terms and 
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superficialities of form (Crist v. Maplc,ton City 28 Utcih 2d 7, 
497 P. 2d 633). 
In Prince v. Peterson 538 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1975) the 
pleadings were attacked as being deficient. The Utah Supreme 
Court held otherwise, stating, on page 1328, that: 
"In regard to the claimed def ic ienc ie s in the pleading 
and proof of damages, these observations are to be 
made: the purpose of pleadings is to advise the 
opponent and give him an opportunity to meet the issues 
and the contentions. If that purpose is served, the 
requirements of the law are met." 
Rule lO(c), URCP, specifically provides for adoption~ 
reference and states that "An exhibit to a pleading is a part 
thereof for all purposes." 
follows: 
In 61A Am. Jur. 2d 60 the general rule is stated as 
"Many cases take the position that for the purpose of 
determining the sufficiency of the statement of the 
cause of action, an exhibit on which the cause of 
action is founded is to be deemed a part of the 
pleading when made so by apt words thereof, and that 
the pleading and exhibit forming a part thereof are to 
be construed together." 
Defendants rely on Chesney v. Chesney 33 Utah 503, 94 
P.989, an old Utah case following the minority rule and adhering 
to the technicalities of strict pleading. That case is not in 
harmony with the new more liberal rules of civil procedure and 
should not be followed by this court, particularly when Rule 
lO(c), URCP, now specifically follows the general rule. In this 
regard, 61A Am. Jur. 2d 61 states: 
"It seems generally agreed, evcn in the absence of an}' 
controlling statute or rule of practice, that it is 
permissiblf' to refer to, and thereby make a part of one 
count or defense, the whole or a part of the 
allegations of another count or defense in the same 
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pleading. In many jurisdictions the statutes and rules 
of practice expressly authorize the adoption or the 
incorporation by reference of statements in different 
parts of the same pleading or of other pleadings or 
motions, and of matters incorporated in copies or 
exhibits attached to the pleadings." 
Accordingly, the trial court erred when it ruled 
Pl?intiffs' Verified Complaint did not sufficiently raise the 
issues regarding building code violations, health code violations 
and waste when those issues were specifically adopted by 
reference to the "Notice To Cure Defaults" attached as an Exhibit 
to the Verified Complaint and added no new claim for relief. 
Defendants were not unfairly surprised or prejudiced where the 
record shows the notice and complaint were received by Defendants 
nearly three years prior to trial and those issues were addressed 
in interrogatories and included in Defendants own proposed 
pre-trial order (R 83) submitted to the trial court more than a 
year prior to trial (R 74). The trial court should be instructed 
to consider the evidence presented in the five day trial on these 
issues and make appropriate rulings on them. These issues 
consumed most of the trial time (R 303) and it would be expensive 
and contrary to the purpose as expressed in Rule 1, URCP, to 
require a new trial on these issues. 
POINT II 
ASSUMING, FOR SAKE OF ARGUMENT, THAT POINT I ABOVE ON 
CROSS-APPEAL IS NOT WELL TAKEN, THE TRIAL COURT NEVERTHELESS 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND MADE 
DURING TRIAL. 
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When it became apparent to Plaintjff during trial that 
Defendants' objections to evidence on waste and building and 
health code violations were being takPn seriously by the trial 
court, Plaintiff filed a "Motion To Amend Complaint" (R 71 S) 
together with supporting points and authorities (R 216-218). As 
shown in POINT I above, the rules provide for liberal 
construction of pleadings and amendments in order to present 
controversies on their merits and, in this case, Defendants wouN 
not be unfairly surprised or prejudiced by allowing such an 
amendment because they not only knew of Plaintiff's claims and 
included them in their own pre-trial order, but also because 
continuances of the trial gave Defendants almost a full month (R 
194 and R 266) to prepare to meet these issues even if Defendants 
had been surprised at trial by presentation of these issues. 
However, Defendants were not surprised nor prejudiced 
by these issues, as these claims were included in Defendants' o~ 
pre-trial order (R 87-88). In this regard, Eng v. Stein 599 P.2d 
769 (Arizona, 1979) is instructive. There the court, on page 
800, stated: 
"The amendment of pleadings to conform to the evidenCT 
is to permit the case to be tried ultimately on the 
merits in one trial with all parties having a 
resolution of their disputes without a multiplicity of 
suits. Such trial amendments should be permitted when 
neither party is surprised nor prejudiced by the 
allowance of the amendment. 
In the case at issue the amount of the additional 
claims had been raised in pre-trial discovery, and t~ 
defendant cannot be said to be surprised nor prejudic~ 
by the allowance of the amendment to reflect the 
additional amount." 
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Rule B(f), URCP, provides that "All pleadings shall be 
construed as to do substantial justice." 
Rule 15(b), URCP, provides, in part, that: 
"If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground 
that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, 
the court may allow the pleadings to be amended when 
the presentation of the merits of the action will be 
subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to 
satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence 
would prejudice him in maintaining his action or 
defense upon the merits." 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 
205, 381 P. 2d 86 stated that the fundamental purpose of 
liberalizing the rules of pleading and procedure was to allow the 
parties to present all their legitimate contentions and that all 
the parties are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an 
opportunity to meet them. 
In Wells v. Wells 2 Utah 2d 241, 272 P.2d 167, Rule 
15(b), URCP, was examined in detail. The Utah Supreme Court 
quoted Jackson v. Cope 1 Utah 2d 330, 266 P.2d 500 with approval 
on page 170 as follows: 
'"* * *amendments should be liberally allowed in the 
interest of justice whenever it will aid in settling an 
entire controversy. The limitations thereon should be 
whether the matters involved are such as can be 
conveniently and effectively handled in one trial 
without injury to substantive rights.'" 
The Wells case discussed the confusion caused by 
different meanings and construction given the term "cause of 
action" and then stated, on page 170, that the: 
"test is not whether under technical rules of pleading 
a new cause of action is introduced, but rather the 
test is whether a "'wholly different cause of action'" 
or "legal obligation" is introduced, that is, an 
amendment will be allowed if a change is not made in 
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the liability sought to be enforced against the 
defendant." 
The same liability has been sought by Plaintiff on the 
waste and building and health code violations as on the insurance 
violation, namely, a forfeiture of the lease. No new legal 
obligation is introduced by a consideration of these additional 
defaults. The subject matter throughout the course of this case 
has been whether or not Defendants have co!11JTlitted breaches of the 
lease justifying forfeiture. As this court held in Graham v. 
Street 166 P.2d 524 (Utah 1946), pages 527 and 528: 
"The new allegations do not introduce matters which 
interject an entirely new, distinct and unrelated legal 
obligation but enlarge on the facts so as to present a 
series of transactions all germane and forming a 
connected whole reflecting the manner in which the 
plaintiff suffered injury, the bounds of an amendment 
are determined by what can fbe) conveniently and 
efficiently [handled) as a single unit * * * without 
injury to substantive rights." 
"It is not required that a series of transactions so 
closely related in time and fact as to produce a 
substantial cause and effect transition be grouped and 
compartmentalized so as to fall into designated types 
of legal actions. The law serves life." 
The law should also protect life when the evidenced 
presented showed that this public facility was "dangerous to 
human life" (R 365, 366). 
In 61A Am. Jur. 2d 297-98 it states: 
"An application for leave to amend is ordinarily 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, 
and as a rule, this discretion will not be disturbed oo 
appeal except in case of an evident abuse thereof, or 
unless the appellant shows affirmatively that he was 
prejudiced by the ruling. The discretion with which 
the court is vested in respect to the allowance or 
refusal of amendments is a sound discretion to be 
exercised in the furtherance of justice, and may not bE 
exercised to defeat justice. The court may not 
unreasonably refuse leave to amend." 
20 
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''It is a general rule that amendments to pleadings are 
favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance 
of justice, in order that every case may so far as 
possible be determined on its real facts, and in order 
to speed the trial of causes, or prevent circuity of 
action and unnecessary expense." 
These general rules are followed in Utah, as shown by 
Gillman v. Hansen 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 P.2d 1045 where this court 
stated, on page 1046: 
"Ordinarily the allowance of an amendment by leave of 
court is a matter which lies within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. This discretion, 
however, is to be exercised in the furtherance of 
justice and must not be exercised so as to defeat 
justice. The rule in this state has always been to 
allow amendments freely where justice requires, and 
especially is this true before trial." 
This court then recited Rule l(a), URCP, and held that 
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing the amendment. 
In First Security Bank of Utah v. Colonial Ford 597 P.2d 859 
(Utah 1979) the court quoted Rule 15(b) in its entirety and noted 
that it was in harmony with Rule 54(c) (1), quoting that rule, and 
then stated, on page 861 that: 
"Whatever else may he said about whether it is 
mandatory or discretionary under the rules just quoted 
to grant such a motion to amend, it could not be made 
plainer that the underlying purpose of the rules is 
that judg~ent should be granted in accordance with the 
law and the evidence as the ends of justice require; 
and that this is true whether the pleadings are 
actually amended or not." 
Defendants, since the "Notice To Cure Defaults" dated 
March 20, 1978, have known of Plaintiff's claims. The health 
code violations were specifically pleaded by reference to state 
statute and the date the specific regulations were adopted by the 
Utah State Division of Health. Under Rule 9 (i), URCP, this is a 
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sufficient allegation. 
access to such regulations ancl an opportunity to rcquPst ;in 
inspection to determinP what 1vas neccssar:: tri rure t hF:: <icf0ult. 
In paragraph 11 of the lease agreement, Defendants a0recd tc. 
operate the premises in complianre with the laws, nrdinances anrl 
regulations of Washington County and the State of Utah. 
From the moment the lease was cxecutecl the Defendants 
are deemed to know the requirements of such laws, ordinances anct 
regulations. In fact, the existing laws, ordinances, and 
regulations become a part of the contract. (17 Am. Jur 2d 
Contracts Section 374). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING Tlll\T PLAINTIFFS fll\D 
1-JAIVED THE FORFEITURE BY ACCEPTANCE OF REUT. 
The "Notice To Cure Defaults" given to Defendants on ITT 
about March 20, 1978 stated at the hottom of page two (R 20, 364) 
that: 
"No waiver of this notice or the required thirty (30) 
days to cure the above-mentioned defaults will be 
granted unless in writing and signed by all parties 
concerned." 
In the Verified Complaint Plaintiffs alleged Defendants had 
breached the lease and Plaintiffs were therefore entitled to 
possession (paragraph 25 on R 4). Plaintiffs also alleged that 
Defendants were in possession of the premises (paragraph 7 on 
R2), which fact was admitted by Defendants (raraqraph 7 on R44). 
That situation continued from May 8, 1978 when the Complaint was 
filed until the trial which commenced on January 29, 1981, almost 
three years later. Monthly rent under the lease was $700.00 per 
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Month (paragraph 2(B) of R 11). That amounts to $22,400.00 over 
the 32 months between the filing of the complaint and the trial. 
Apparently the trial court felt Plaintiffs, despite the express 
statement that no waiver would be granted unless in writing and 
signed by all the parties, should have refused the $22,400.00 
rent even though Defendants continued in possession and collected 
all the income generated by the business during this period. 
such a result is unconscionable as it rewards Defendants for 
being in default and penalizes Plaintiffs for resorting to the 
courts to preserve their legal rights under the lease. 
follows: 
The general rule is stated in 49 Am. Jur. 2d 1031-32 as 
"It is a general rule that a lessor is estopped from 
asserting a forfeiture for a breach of covenant or 
condition in a lease, or that he waives his right to 
such a forfeiture, where after and with full knowledge 
or notice of such breach he accepts rent from his 
tenant, unless there are circumstances arising from 
such acceptance of rent by him so as to negative the 
presumption of his af f irmance of the continuance of the 
lease." 
Here there were circumstances negating the presumption 
of the general rule because the "Notice To Cure Defaults" 
expressly stated there would be no waiver and it would be 
unconscionable in this case to deny Plaintiffs the rents while 
attempting to assert their contractual rights, thereby rewarding 
Defendants for their alleged breaches. 
In Kenny v. Seu Si Lun 101 Minn. 253, 112 NW 220 the 
court held that if payment to the landlord is not made as rent 
accruing under the lease, but as compensation for the lessee's 
wrongful withholding of the possession or on a quantum meruit 
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basis, it will not operate as a waiver. It cannot be doubted 
that the parties, through their attornevs, treated the rent 
either as compensation for withholding possession or as 
compensation on a quantum meruit basis, otherwise, they would noL 
have pursued the litigation for three years until trial. 
In Karbelnig v. Brothwell 244 Cal. App. 2d 333, 53 Cal, 
Rptr. 335 the court said that where the lessor qives notice such 
as given here, that the acceptance of rent after breach of a 
covenant will not be construed as a consent to the breach or a 
waiver of the right to assert a forfeiture. 
The authorities are split on whether the acceptance of 
rent due after a forfeiture has been declared constitutes a 
waiver. In 49 Am. Jur. 2d 1035 it states: 
"The better view is said to be that the acceptance of 
rent due after a forfeiture has been declared does not 
waive the forfeiture as a matter of law." 
The theory behind this general rule is that a 
declaration of forfeiture shows an irrevocable intention to avoid 
the lease. This better view is, in this case, buttressed by the 
express declaration of the Plaintiffs that no waiver would be 
granted. 
Waiver has been defined, in Blacks Law Dictionary 96 
(5th Ed. 1979) as "The intentional or voluntary relinquishment of 
a known right." The question of waiver then becomes primarily~ 
issue of intent, and when that intent is expressly stated in the 
"Notice To Cure Defaults" that no waiver would be granted unless 
in writing signed by all parties, that expression of intent must 
control. 
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CONCLUSION 
The award of Plaintiffs' attorney's fees should be 
sustained and the cause remanded with directions to the trial 
court to consider the evidence presented at trial on issues of 
waste, building code violations and heal.th code violations and 
rule accordingly inasmuch as Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint 
either sufficiently raised these issues under the liberalized 
Utah rules and cases or the Plaintiff's motion to amend should 
have been granted. Further, that acceptance of rent was not a 
waiver of the forfeiture where Plaintiffs expressly stated in the 
"Notice To Cure Defaults" that no waivers would be granted. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of February, 1982. 
ATKIN, WRIGHT & MILES 
£oillf L. MILES 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
Respondent And Cross-Appellant 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the CJ~ day of February, 
1982, I delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to Mr. Michael D. Hughes at Allen, Thompson 
& Hughes at 148 East Tabernacle~t.George, 
-~' Secretary 
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